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THE HALL OF MIRRORS: WIFE ABUSE AND
THE LAW IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CHANGE
The feminist reform movement has focused public attention on
the great number of women who are beaten by their husbands and
the unresponsiveness of the legal system to this critical situation. 1
For all concerned with the dignity of women, eradication of wife
abuse2 is an essential goal. 3
Many present and proposed solutions concentrate either on
erasing the sexist attitudes which breed and condone wife abuse,4
or on helping the beaten wife to become the kind of person un
likely to be victimized. 5 These approaches are inadequate solutions
1. See Gingold, One of These Days-Pow-Right in the Kisser: The Truth
About Battered Wives, Ms., August 1976, at 51; Newman, The Wife Beaters, PARADE
MAGAZINE, June 1975, at 37; Segal, Violent Men . . . Embattled Women, C9.s
MOPOLITAN, May 1976, at 238; Stuart & McEvoy, Middle Class Violence, PSYCH.
TODAY, November 1970, at 52; Battered Wives: Cheswick Woman Paid, NEWSWEEK,
July 9, 1973, at 37; The Wife Beaters, MCCALLS MAGAZINE, June 1975, at 110;
The Wife Beaters, WOMAN'S DAY, March 1976, at 61.
2. The term wife abuse, rather than wife battering or wife assault, is used
throughout the article to avoid confusion with legal definitions of assault and battery.
See Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 135, 135 n.l (1977).
3. See, e.g., [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2527 (report on International
Law Conference on Violence in the Family).
4. Because wife abuse has only recently become a public issue, research into
its causes has just begun. Of the theories so far advanced, those which concentrate
on various manifestations of sexism and sex role stereotyping seem to offer the most
reasonable explanations. The frustrations which a man experiences in trying to be
powerful and "manly" in a social and economic environment wherein most people
have little power or satisfaction can be vented on the one person over whom he has
complete power. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 61-64 (1976). In addition, many
people are socialized in a violent family environment. The sons of abusive husbands
often grow up to abuse their wives. Similarly, many abused wives are the daughters
of abused women. Id. at 22-24. Social pressures on a woman to maintain a happy
home can produce the shame and guilt which lead many abused wives to endure the
abuse rather than leave the home or seek help. Id. at 79-83. Finally, the sexist at
titudes pervading the legal system exacerbate the problem and delay its solution. R.
LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 172-73 (1977).
5. One typical solution is expressed as follows:
A woman must establish that she will not tolerate being beaten. She must
issue an ultimatum and be prepared to back up her statements with action.
Only after a husband is convinced that his wife will not put up with his
abusive actions can any real progress be made toward changing his violent
behavior.
'
R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 203.
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for the problem of wife abuse. Attitudes change slowly. Although
sexism must be constantly challenged and combatted, the abused
wife needs immediate and effective protection. In addition, al
though for an individual wife, self-help or self-reform is perhaps
the only viable short term solution, we contend that it is irrespon
sible, immoral, and ultimately ineffective for the law to demand of
the victim that she not allow herself to be victimized. The legal
justice system must do more; it must act quickly and forcefully to
protect a victim who, without such protection, will be forced to
continue living with her assailant, subject to further attacks of in
creasing severity.6 To adequately protect abused wives, the law,
not the victim, must change.
An analysis of the nature of social change or revolution ex
plains the dynamics of the social and legal structure which must be
changed to effectively cope with the problem of wife abuse.
Theorists of ideological revolution posit7 that when a paradigmS in '
a particular region of human endeavor is challenged successfully it
loses its universal influence. This brings on a period of crisis,
characterized by conflict, contradiction, and controversy over com
peting perspectives9 which continues until a new perspective gains
universal acceptance and becomes the paradigm for that activity. 10
At one time the universal view held that the relative positions
of men and women were divinely ordained, naturally logical, and
unalterable. 11 As a result of reformist activism that paradigm has
6. See generally Gingold, supra note 1.
7. In this discussion, the term "ideological revolution" includes both social and
scientific ideology. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1970) (scientific ideology); Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition
from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J- 286-87 (1962) (social ideology).
8. A paradigm is an accepted theory, view, or standard which supports an entire
body of scientific or sociological activity. T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 10.
9. T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 93.
10. Woodard, supra note 7, at 287.
History can . , , be viewed as the chronicle of the rise and fall of various
standards. And the most cataclysmic phases in the saga of any society, the
so-called "watershed" periods, are those in which fundamental standards are
supplanted by new ones; standards which, by condemning conduct and con
ditions theretofore condoned, or vice versa, generate a new type of pressure
either to reform the existing, or to devise new, social institutions.
ld.
11. "The biologists of the ancient world-of whom the foremost was Aristotle
-had affirmed that, saving unusual circumstances, males of all species live longer
than females. . . . Males represented the perfection of the human species; females
were an imperfection of nature ...." Herlihy, The Natural History of Medieval Wo
men, NATURAL HISTORY, March 1978, at 56. "Men live longer than women naturali
ter, 'according to the natural order.' " ld. at 56, 59.
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lost its universality.12 Social and legal attitudes toward the status of
women are clearly in a crisis stage,13 and both civil and criminal
law reflect uncertainty, ambivalence, and the presence of unsettled
and opposing views. 14 Newly emerging standards, by condemning
behavior which had previously been condoned, are generating
pressure to reform the legal system's response to women who are
abused by men. IS In order to achieve justice, the legal system
must apply to abusive husbands those sanctions used against per~
sons who cause physical harm or death to others.
I.

SOCIAL IDEOLOGY AND THE LAW

Efforts directed at changing the orientation of the legal justice
system toward abused women and abusive husbands must incor~
porate an understanding of both the relationship between social
values and the law, and the intrinsic characteristics of ideological
revolution. 16 Past reformations of social and legal attitudes toward
economic class structure and racial superiority suggest the manner
12. "Whatever might have been the common law view of the right of a husband
to chastise his wife, the modem view is clearly to the contrary and inhibits the use of
physical force or violence upon the person of the wife." Berberian v. Berberian, 109
R.1. 273, 277, 284 A.2d 72, 74 (1971).
For this Court now to act on Hawkins' fonnulation of the medieval view that
husband and wife are "esteemed but as one Person in Law, and are pre
sumed to have but one Will" would indeed be "blind imitation of the past."
It would require us to disregard the vast changes in the status of woman
the extention of her rights and correlative duties-whereby a wife's legal
submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the En
glish speaking world generally but emphatically so in this country.
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960).
13. See note 16 infra and text accompanying note 29 infra.
14. See, for example, the discussion of interspousal tort immunity at text ac
companying notes 117-48 infra.
15. For illustrations of changing standards and judicial attitudes in the criminal
law, see note 49 infra.
16. T. KUHN, supra note 7. "Revolutions" of political and social ideology paral
lel those of scientific thought. ld. at 92. Scientific revolutions, Kuhn says, "necessi
tate the community's rejection of one time-honored ... theory in favor of another
incompatible with it." ld. at 6. They are always accompanied by controversy. "[Elach
transfonn[s] . . . the world within which scientific work [is] done." ld. Once the
previous institution or belief has been challenged, a crisis occurs in which a choice
must be made between competing paradigms. ld. at 93-94. Thus, once the concept of
women as naturally inferior beings no longer held sway, the legal and social at
titudes toward women were in crisis. The crisis exists today, resulting in contra
dictory societal responses, with controversy accompanying each change. Laws not
enforced by police, prosecutors, or judges, and inconsistent police response to
"domestic disturbances" furnish quick manifestations of the tunnoil that inheres in
the crisis stage. See text accompanying notes 49-115 infra.
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in which statutory and case law develop to reflect social values. A
brief digression to examine the effect of Social Darwinism and the
industrial revolution on the status of the poor, and the social con
text of the rise and fall of the "separate but equal" doctrine will il
lustrate the pertinent relationships.
Social Darwinism applied theories of natural selection to so
cial class structure; assuming that those who rose to the top did
so because they were most "fit" and that the poverty stricken were
at the bottom because they had been "selected out."17 Continuing
development of the industrial revolution altered society's concept
of poverty. Under the new view, a person's economic status no
longer reflected her or his character, but was instead a result of
economic cycles beyond the control of the individual. 18 This
modern approach removed much of the stigma from low economic
status and made the poor deserving of social and legal assistance.
Regardless of our current view of the past, interpretation of
the law occurs within the context of the social definitions then ex
tant. The law thus has integrity within its particular social envi
ronment. 19 "It is important not to delude ourselves into thinking
that [what we regard as] ideological monstrosities were constructed
by monsters. "20 Plessy v. Ferguson 21 established the "separate but
equal" doctrine applied by the Supreme Court in public educa
tion cases. In 1954, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education 22
reached the conclusion that "separate but equal" was inherently
17. Betten, American Attitudes Toward the Poor, 65 CURRENT HISTORY 1, 2
(1965). "Although most Social Darwinists did not advocate a complete end to charity,
they did argue that charity perpetuated the weaker elements of society and that desti
tution was useful in culling inferior people." Id. at 3.
18. Woodard, supra note 7, at 304-05.
19. Snyder, Legal Change and Social Value, in IMPACT ERA: LIMITATIONS AND
POSSIBILITIES 144-45 (1976). Kuhn's analysis of the nature of scientific revolution
illustrates the concept of a paradigm within the ideology of its own time.
The more they [scientists] study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, . . . the more
certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole,
neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than
those current today . . . . [S]cience has included bodies of belief quite in
compatible with the ones we hold today.
T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 2.
"Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our
present vantage, they attempt to display the historial integrity of that science in its
own time." Id. at 3.
20. W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 21 (1971).
2l. 163 u.S. 537 (1896).
22. 347 u.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" educational facilities are inher
ently unequal and thus deny equal protection).
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unequal. Each interpretation of the Constitution was correct within
the context of the social ideology of its time. Plessy rested on the
foundation of a pervasive belief in the superiority of the white race.
By the time the Court decided Brown, however, social reformers
and the Court had successfully challenged the reasoning on which
Plessy was based. 23 The paradigm based on the belief in white
supremacy had lost its universal acceptance. As one social ideology
gave way to the beginnings of another, the legal orientation toward
the rights of racial minorities was correspondingly altered.
The Social and Legal Status of Women
At one time, similarly, it was considered to be within the na
tural order for a woman to be subjected to the control of her hus
band. 24 This perception of the physical subservience of married,
women harmonized with the then existing political structure. Polit
ically, legally, and socially, a woman upon marriage was subsumed
by her husband. She retained virtually no personal, contractual, or
property rights. 25
The truth of how women came to hold this inferior position
may be lost in prehistory, but possible scenarios have been pre
sented in mythology, as well as in works of history and sociology. 26
23. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
For a discussion of the development of the jurisprudential attitude which led from
Plessy to Brown, see Graham, A Jurisprudence of Equality: The Fourteenth Amend
ment and School Desegregation, 11 AKRON L. REV. 203, 209-19 (1977).
24. "Ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands . . . ." 1 Peter 3: 1-3:5.
"The existence of civil and religious laws giving men superior rights over women
nurtured the belief-born in the dim past in the smoke-filled caves of primitives
that men also had the right to beat their wives." R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note
4, at 31-32. "For too long, Anglo-American law treated a man's physical abuse of his
wife as different from any other assault, and, indeed, as an acceptable practice."
Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d
165 (1978).
25. See text accompanying notes 118-22 infra.
26. We can imagine that when people lived at the mercy of nature, physical
attributes determined social order. Women, the child bearers, were unsuited for long
hunting or war-making sojourns, and the physical size and strength of men gave
them power and authority.
Welsh legends relate that in the early times of the great and powerful tribes,
women were accorded freedom, respect, and love, although the monarchy was held
by males. The connection between intercourse and conception was unknown. Preg
nancy and childbirth were miracles wrought by women and the gods. Fatherhood
was an unknown concept; a man's heirs were the children of his sisters or other
female relatives. Sex was free and always an incident of love. Rape was virtually
nonexistent; marriage unknown.
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For example, Brownmiller, in Against Our Will,27 posits this ex
planation of the earliest acceptance of male domination by women
who were, anatomically, the natural prey of the men:
[A]mong those creatures who were her predators, some might
serve as her chosen protectors. Perhaps it was thus that the risky
bargain was struck. Female fear of an open season of rape, and
not a natural inclination toward monogamy, motherhood, and
love, was probably the single causative factor in the original sub
jugation of woman by man, the most important key to historic
dependence, her domestication by protective mating. 28

Woman thus gave up her freedom for protection. In this social
context wife beating was accepted as an incident of ownership. "If
Brownmiller is right, the female of the species paid a great price
for protection. She sacrificed her power and, through monogamous
loyalty to her husband, became the exclusive property of her pro
tector. "29 This concept of natural order prevailed unchallenged
until the twentieth century, when it began to wither.
Isolating the precise factors which cause an ideology to lose its
power is never easy. A variety of technological developments along
with movements for social and legal equality certainly contributed
to the downfall of old notions of male superiority. Struggles for
equality of opportunity regardless of race, nationality, religion, and
social position, foreshadowed the feminist reform movement. 30
Technological advances, from the industrial revolution to the com
puter age, have minimized the extent to which power derives from

Observation of cattle breeding eventually developed perception of the connec
tion between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. The desire was born in men to know
their own children. The only way to accomplish this was to require sexual fidelity by
the women. In return, the men had to bind themselves also. Voila! Marriage. A new
era dawned-inheritance through the male line, the reduction of women to the status
of property, rape, the exaltation and protection of virginity, jealousy, guilt, and, of
course, adultery. For a rich and lyrical rendition of these legends, see E. WALTON,
THE ISLAND OF THE MIGHTY (1970) (from the fourth branch of THE BOOKS OF THE
WELSH MABINOGION).
27. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
28. Id. at 16.
29. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 26. "With the advent of the pairing marriage,
the man seized the reins in the home and began viewing the people in it as units of
property that comprised his wealth-in short, as chattel." Id. at 27. "If a woman
showed any signs of having a will or a mind of her own, it seemed only natural that
she be beaten as a strong-willed horse might be whipped and finally subdued." Id.
30. "Although the industrial revolution did not directly cause feminism, it pro
vided the context for the first collective assault on traditional ideas about woman's
'place.' " W. CHAFE, WOMEN & EQUALITY 24 (1977).
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physical strength. Medical developments creating effective birth
control methods have maximized a woman's choice with respect to
childbearing. These advances have greatly expanded the range of
potential roles women can play in society.
Whatever the causes, the old ideology has lost its universal
influence and faces strong competition. 31 Thus, attitudes toward
the status of women in our society are now at a crisis stage. Pat
terns of social behavior between men and women, including mar
ried couples, are changing along with traditional legal responses to
these relationships.32 Pressure is building to reform the attitude of
the legal system toward abused women and abusive husbands, with
a greater emphasis on using the power of that system to protect the
victims. 33

The Search for Solutions
As new standards emerge condemning wife abuse, pressure
increases for reform of the existing institutional response. The de
sign of the response will be based on the perceived causes of wife
abuse. We may perceive the problem to be internal to the victim,
and therefore find solutions which change or help her to not invite
or allow such abuse. Alternatively, the energy of society's institu
tions may be directed toward dealing in a universal manner with
the source of the abuse, the abusive husband. 34
Concentrating on the actions or characteristics of the abused
wife "blames the victim. "35 This can include two approaches.
31. For example, although the Federal Equal Rights Amendment has not been
fully ratified, many states have added versions of the Amendment to their own state
constitutions.
32. Stimpson, Sex, Gender and American Culture, in WOMEN AND MEN:
CHANGING ROLES, RELATIONSIDPS, AND PERCEPTIONS 201 (A. Cater ed. 1977).
33. One of the greatest functions fulfilled by reformers is to sense that, in
one way or another, for one reason or another, man's ability to control his
environment has developed to a point where society can realistically aspire
to abolish conduct or conditions theretofore conceived to be, and accepted
as, unalterable.
Woodard, supra note 7, at 287.
34. We recognize that the abusive husband is also society's child. See note 116

infra.
35. "Blaming the victim" is an intellectual process whereby a social prob
lem is analyzed in such a way that the causation is found to be in the qual
ities and characteristics of the victim rather than in any deficiencies or struc
tural defects in his environment. In addition, it is usually found that these
characteristics are not inherent or genetic but are, rather, socially deter
mined. They are stigmas of social origin and are, therefore, no fault of the
victim himself. He is to be pitied, not censured, but nevertheless his prob
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Either the victim is actually to blame, or if she is not to blame, the
problem nevertheless is caused by her own characteristics. The
first view sees the wife as being or doing something which invites
or incites her husband to abuse her. She nags, denies him sex,
neglects the housekeeping, serves T.V. dinners, and may even in
truth want to be beaten. 36 The response is to pity the husband37
and, afford no remedy to the undeserving wife. She had better
learn to be a "good wife" in order to preserve marital harmony. 38
A more humanitarian approach concedes that the husband is
the non-incited aggressor, but still sees the problem and its solu
tion in terms of characteristics of the wife. She must learn to stand
up to her husband and not accept the violence. 39 Failing this, she
must gain emotional strength and learn a skill or trade, thereby
establishing her independence, and either leave the home or "kick
the bum out."40
The victim reform approach is especially appealing to those
working "in the field" with abused wives. And for the individual
victim who cannot wait until society and the law change, this may
be the most realistic approach. The assertive, confident, and inde

lems are to be defined as rooted basically in his own characteristics.
Ryan, Emotional Disorder as a Social Problem; Implications for Mental Health
Programs, 41 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 638, 639 (1971).
36. Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOM
EN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 138 (1977). "The theory of feminine masochism is one of the
more enduring concepts of Sigmund Freud, who frequently addressed himself to the
'woman problem: Freud believed that masochism-pleasure in pain-is inherent in
the nonnal female nature ...." Id. at 143.
37. When a battered woman told a therapist that she was extremely frightened
"of [her] husband because he had tried to strangle [her] the night before, the
therapist answered: 'But ma'am, do you ever think how terrible it is for your hus
band that you're so afraid of him?'" B. WARRIOR, WORKING ON WIFE ABUSE 1-2
(1977) (directory of people and organizations working to combat wife abuse). This
book may be obtained by writing to the author at 46 Pleasant St., Cambridge, MA
02139.
38. One wife, after being beaten, overheard the officer who refused to arrest
her husband say, "Maybe if I beat my wife she'd act right too." Bruno v. Codd, 90
Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978).
39. It's important that a woman do two things to break the battered-wife
syndrome. One is . . . not to accept herself as a person deserving to be
beaten. This requires active, positive steps by the woman, which may in
clude seeking professional help both psychiatric and legal, discussing her
feelings with her husband and perhaps ultimately leaving him.
R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 203.
40. We want to "make the victims less vulnerable, send them back into battle
with better weapons, thicker armor, a higher level of morale." W. RYAN, supra note
20, at 28.
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pendent person is, indeed, less likely to be victimized by other
individuals or by society.41 But it hardly seems appropriate for so
ciety or our legal system to accept such a stopgap measure as an
ultimate remedy. 42
The greatest problem with concentrating on the victim is that
such an approach inevitably forces the woman to either change
herself or get out of the marriage. For many women, divorce is not
a viable or acceptable course. 43 Most abused women need and seek
protection from abuse, including a response from police and the
courts which does not tolerate wife abuse. 44 Concentrating on the
victim also avoids dealing forcefully and effectively with the aggres
sor through the criminal justice system. "[U]ntil interspousal as
sault is characterized and treated as a crime, a bodily injury crime
that society will not tolerate, it has little chance of early solu
tion. "45
An approach focusing on the abusing husband could provide
the abused wife with the immediate protection she needs and de
serves. Additionally, this approach would affirm that the law is en
forced for the benefit of society; that the problem of abused wives
is not only an individual problem, but a detriment to society as a
whole. 46
Arguments against arrest and detention of the abusing husband
emphasize his role as provider for his family. This is part of the
41. Id.
42. Similarly, the store owner may keep a gun to scare off thieves, as the police
cannot guard the store at all times. Nevertheless, the law accepts responsibility for
arresting and dealing with the thief, and does not require the store owner to handle
thieves single-handedly.
43. A divorce may not be acceptable for religious or social reasons. In addition,
a woman may not be able to afford private legal counsel and may not be eligible to
obtain help through a legal aid society either because she has too much income or
because divorces are low priority cases at legal aid offices. Note, supra note 2, at 152
n.120 (1977).
44. Although it seems likely that once a woman brings legal action against her
husband divorce is inevitable, this may not always be the case. At any rate, the law
should not require that divorce proceedings be instituted before any relief is avail
able.
45. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 161.
46. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 9 (1972).
An analogy discussed in W. RYAN, supra note 20, is the problem of lead paint in
apartment houses, which causes blindness and brain damage when eaten by chil
dren. Public health departments may produce materials urging parents to watch their
children to prevent their ingesting paint, stressing the responsibility of the parents in
safeguarding the health of their children. This approach focuses on the victims. In
this situation, Ryan's "universalistic" approach would mean enforcing the existing
statutory sanctions against landlords for using or retaining the lead paint. Id. at 22-23.
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view that wife abuse is merely a family matter, to be interfered
with as little as possible by the forces of the law. However, the
woman who has been severely and repeatedly beaten by her hus
band until she is desperate enough to call the police has a different
view of her problem.
When the victim calls the police, her essential concern is protec
tion. She wants the law to stop her husband from beating her.
She is demanding her rights as a citizen to protection from
violent force. She is also demanding justice. She wants the per
son who has committed an assault on her body taken away,
punished, and prevented from assaulting her again. 47

Thus, between the two possible approaches to wife abuse,
focusing on the victim and dealing with the abuser, the latter will
provide a comprehensive solution to the problem. Although focus
ing on the victim can provide temporary relief to individual vic
tims, it can not solve the problem permanently. The legal justice
system must strive for long-term remedies based on affirmative
condemnation of abusing husbands. The new standards emerging
from the ideological crisis demand such a remedy.
Although withering, the old ideology is hardly dead. The
abused wife seeking redress through police and the courts will face
substantial hurdles, including an illogical, intimidating, and in
humane array of laws and legal procedures seemingly designed to
guarantee frustration, failure, and ultimately, injustice. 48 Undoubt
edly, if the abusing husband committed such brutal and repeated
attacks on persons other than his wife, he would be arrested and
incarcerated with little concern for the financial situation of his fam
ily. It is cruelly ironic that concern for the wife's financial well
being becomes a primary consideration only when she is the victim
and her physical and emotional health are jeopardized.
II.

THE CRIMINAL

LAw

Introduction
The old common law view which allowed a husband to beat
his wife has disappeared from the de jure criminal justice system. 49
47. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 162.
48. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 147.
49. In Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975-76 (1977),
,.ev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), the court stated, "If the allegations of the instant
complaint ... are true, only the written law has changed; in reality wife beating is
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But the remaining hurdles that effectively discourage and prevent
abused wives from getting help through today's criminal justice sys
tem illustrate that the system retains de facto license for spousal
abuse. The obstacles include failure to arrest, systematic nonen
forcement and regressive judicial interpretation of existing laws,
and an absence of effective remedies.
Any individual who has been assaulted can, and should, rea
sonably expect prompt and effective police response. In many re
ported instances, however, when confronted with a domestic situa
tion, police officers avoid their obligations. 50 They encourage the
offensive behavior, intimidate or demean the woman, and in most
cases neither escort the woman to receive medical help nor arrest
the offender. 51
At the prosecutorial stage, a woman is faced with a discretion
ary system of selective enforcement. This barrier results in further
screening and diversion of potential interspousal litigation. Prose
cutors, like police officers, are reluctant to encourage prosecu
tion. 52
still condoned, if not approved, by some of those charged with protecting its
victims.'"
The early cases allowed at least moderate chastisement. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss.
(1 Walker) 156 (1824) (husband permitted to moderately chastise wife without sub
jecting himself to "vexatious" prosecution); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868) (cri
terion of indictable assault is effect produced, not instrument or manner of producing
it); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263 (1864) ("unless some permanent injury be
inflicted ... the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain

.... ").

Just prior to the turn of the century, however, sentiment changed, and beating
one's wife fell into disfavor. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871) (wife is entitled to
same protection of her person as husband); Bailey v. People, 54 Colo. 337, 342, 130
P. 832, 834 (1913) (defendant's assertion that husband has right to control acts and
will of wife by physical force rejected as "nothing less than monstrous at this period
of our civilization"); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871) (husband in
dicted for manslaughter); State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 335 (1879) (two-year imprisonment for
assault and battery against wife not cruel and unusual punishment). See also State v.
Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890); W. LAFAVE & A. ScO"rr, supra note 46,
at 608.
This change in judicial attitudes was expressly acknowledged in Harris v. State,
71 Miss. 462, 14 So. 266 (1893). "This brutality found in the ancient common law ...
[has been) ... repudiated in the administration of criminal law in our courts." Id. at
464, 14 So. at 268.
SO. See notes 64-75 infra and accompanying text. The great majority of these
beatings take place in the home. "Boston City Hospital reports that approximately 70
per cent of the assault victims received in its emergency room are known to be
women who have been attacked in their homes, usually by a husband or lover." D.
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 12 (footnote omitted). See id. at 16-17.
51. See text accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
52. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
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The offenses of assault and battery are well defined by statute.
There is nothing whatsoever in these laws to prohibit their being
construed to apply to cases involving spousal abuse. 53 As a practical
matter, bruises and lacerations resulting from beating, punching, or
slapping are sufficient to sustain criminal prosecution for the mis
demeanor of assault and battery. 54 Unfortunately, these laws have
been applied in only a handful of cases of interspousal violence. 55
Statistically, formal complaints are rarely filed when any of the
above offenses are committed by a man against his wife. 56 The re
luctance of the male dominated criminal justice system to interfere
in "family quarrels" effectively deprives an abused wife of the pro
tection of assault and battery law. 57
Thus, upon reaching the decision to seek a remedy from the
legal justice system, a woman faces a series of hurdles and filters
that avoid or delay the institutional response. Too often this results

53. "The problem is not a lack of law ... the problem is that existing laws are
systematically unenforced ... women whose husbands beat them-often on a regular
basis-have no effective remedy within the system as it now operates." R. LANGLEY
& R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 154 (quoting Susan Jackson, attorney in San Francisco).
54. "An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to com
mit a violent injury on the person of another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970).
"A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person
of another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1970).
A criminal assault is distinguishable from a battery in that the former is merely
an unlawful attempt to use force to the injury of another, while the latter is the actual
unlawful use or commission of such violence.
55. See note 49 supra.
"By definition, spousal abuse constitutes assault, or aggravated assault depend
ing on the seriousness of the attack, even though the Pennsylvania criminal justice
system refuses to treat it as such." Note, Domestic Relations-The Protection From
Abuse Act-Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1977), 51 TEMP.
L.Q. 116, 123 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
56. D. MARTIN, supra note 4. San Francisco District Attorney's Office Bureau
of Family Relations reported that only eight of several thousand cases processed dur
ing 1973-1974 led to a formal complaint and prosecution. Id. at 109-10. In Columbus,
Ohio only two per cent of 3,626 direct complaints resulted in criminal charges. [d.
at 112.
57. D. Martin, A Feminist Analysis of Wife Beating, at 3 (May 5, 1977) (unpub
lished report prepared for American Psychiatric Association Special Session
Battered Women: Culture as Destiny, Toronto, Canada).
Wife beating is tolerated in a legal system characterized by ancient chas
tisement rigpts and the subordination of women in marriage. Moreover, rein
forced by the nonacknowledgment of its criminal aspects, wife-beating re
flects the devaluation of women as human beings. The legal system only
offers the battered wife a band-aid for her wounds, both physical and
psychological.
Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 159.
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in further beatings. When the present system fails to punish the
offender the law loses its potential deterrent effect. By failing ade
quately to perform their duties, the police, the prosecutors, the
judiciary, and the legislators are all impliedly "blaming the
victim. "58 This approach leaves the wife-victim, rather than the
husband-abuser, at the mercy of the criminal justice system.

The Police Function
Police departments, the only public agency readily accessible
on a twenty-four hour basis, are typically the first outside help
sought by an abused wife. Police calls for family conflicts out
number those for aggravated batteries, murders, and all other seri
ous crimes combined. 59 Officers dread these "domestic distur
bance" calls. This apprehension may result from the high incidence
of violence directed at responding officers.60 Furthermore, many
police officers dislike dealing with, or are unable to cope with, the
emotional state of the parties. 61 Notwithstanding their reluctance,
police officers must respond to these calls effectively. Abused
women expect and deserve immediate response. 62 Once called, of
ficers have an obligation to respond and to reduce the possibility of
recurring violence. 63
In an overwhelming majority of these calls, no arrest is made.
Instead, the police often encourage the woman to reason with her
assailant, and discourage her from demanding that an arrest be
made. 64 This psychological restraint denies the victim her rights to

58. See notes 35-48 supra and accompanying text.
59. Pamas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 WIse. L.
REV. 914 n.2.
60. Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women: Abuse and the Law (Jan. 1977)
(unpublished report). "Disturbances" were the largest incident-related death cate
gory during the period of 1960-1965. "Fifty-eight officers or 21% of the 278 police
men killed in the United States during that period were responding to disturbance
calls." Pamas, supra note 59, at 920 n.25 (citation omitted).
61. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 97.
62. See D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 92.
63. Pamas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family Vio
lence, 36 L. & CONT. PROB. 539, 542 (1971). "[T]he police owe a duty of protection
to battered wives, in the same manner they owe it to any citizen injured by another's
assault ...." Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd,
407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). This case is discussed in full in notes 77-79 infra and ac
companying text.
64. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 92-93. See also Maidment, The Law's Response
to Marital Violence in England and the U.S.A., 26 INT. & COMPo L.Q. 403, 408
(1977).
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be uninjured and to have the offender arrested. Although in other
potentially harmful situations, such as the typical barroom assault,
the police may also encourage conciliation, violence within the
home presents more potential for additional severe physical injury
to the victim. As a practical matter, the victim of domestic violence
often can not remove herself from the premises, especially if there
are children in the home.
When presented with a domestic situation, the police often
suggest that the husband could be out on bail or personal recog
nizance within hours.65 Such suggestions are accurate. The man
will be out on bail, and the woman should be informed of that fact.
This information, however, should not be offered merely to psycho
logically restrain the woman from demanding an arrest. Rather,
the officer should neutrally inform the victim of the probable du
ration of detention, so that she may plan her actions accordingly.
Responding officers also underscore the husband's role as the
woman's only source of income. They point out that an arrest could
result in the loss of his job, an increase in the marital violence, or
both. Often, the police will discourage the complaining victim by
telling her she has a civil problem and should call an attorney.66
All of these typical police reactions to domestic disturbance calls
avoid confrontation of the problems that sparked the complaint in
the first place.
This tepid police response frustrates beaten women who have
turned to society for help by denying them a desperately needed
remedy. Additionally, police leniency reinforces abusive behav
ior. 67 An apathetic police response intensifies the abuser's percep
tion that socially acceptable behavior includes beating his wife. 68
The reinforcement of this social license to abuse, coupled with the
antagonizing nature of a police call to the aggressor, makes calling
65. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 94. Perhaps a modified system of temporary
detention should be used in these situations to detain the offender until an im
mediate protection order is issued by a magistrate.
66. See R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 164.
67. See D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 64 (Commander James D. Bannon, Ad
dress to American Bar Association Conference, Montreal, Canada (1975)). Command
er Bannon has been a member of the Detroit Police Department since 1949 and is
also working toward a doctorate in sociology.
68. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 98, (paraphrasing Commander James D. Ban
non). In Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), the court remarked, "Even more disturbing are incidents al
leged in the affidavits in which the responding officers are quoted as giving support
to the as saulting h us band."
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the police one of the most counterproductive steps an abused
woman can take. A woman who calls the police as a desperate
measure to end a beating, then, is confronted by a painful irony
when this measure aggravates, rather than alleviates, the violence.
Police, as the first social institution called on to respond to a
domestic beating, must reform many of their approaches and tech
niques in order to effectively discharge their obligation to minimize
grossly antisocial behavior.
Police reform is impeded by the officers' personal attitudes be
cause police officers are socialized in the same manner as the citi
zens they are expected to protect. Since patterns of abuse are
common within a family structure69 police officers who come from
violent families may have a predisposition toward domestic violence
that is as severe as the aggressor's. One study reported that a
police officer told an abused woman that he beat his own wife;
another officer told a woman to "go to bed with him like he
wants."70 One commentator believes that these attitudes are a re
sult of the police officers' training; they are taught to avoid arrest. 71
In doing so, police officers ignore the special circumstances of
domestic violence that favor arrest and that require immediate pro
tection for the woman. 72
69. Studies have shown that when children grow up in a home where their
father beats their mother, a male child is more likely later to beat his spouse, and a
female child is more likely to be beaten by her husband. The Battered Woman:
Criminal and Civil Remedies, at 1 (May 5, 1977) (unpublished report prepared for
American Psychiatric Association Special Session-Battered Women: Culture as De
stiny, Toronto, Canada).
70. L. Frost, B. Karl, G.]. Stillson MacDonnell, & D. Minasian, Connecticut
Task Force on Abused Women: Household Violence Study-North Central and Capi
tal Regions, at 11 (March 1977) (unpublished report).
71. Pamas, supra note 59, at 931 n.64. The Michigan Police Training Academy
procedure, set forth in D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 93, states:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
(1) Complainant must sign complaint.
(2) Must appear in court.
(3) Consider loss of time.
(4) Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
(1) Court not in session.
(2) No judge available.
f. Don't be too harsh or. critical.
(footnote omitted).
72. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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The law of arrest compounds these problems by not allowing
for routine apprehension in domestic disturbances. In most juris
dictions, an arrest for a misdemeanor can be made on the spot only
if the act has been committed in the presence of an officer, or if a
warrant has been issued. Because police are usually called to the
scene after a beating, the victim must go to the district attorney's
office or the clerk of courts for a warrant to be issued. 73 This pro
cedure is too slow to offer the needed protection.
The law of arrest poses obstacles to swift detention of assail
ants. Several alternatives exist to overcome these barriers. First, an
officer can, without a warrant, arrest upon the reasonable belief
that a felony was committed and that the person identified com
mitted the crime. 74 Because of the prevailing attitudes regarding
domestic violence and the subjectivity involved in this determina
tion, few arrests are made. Second, in many jurisdictions the
victim can make a citizen's arrest even if the offense is a mis
demeanor. Under this procedure the officer can take the accused
into custody and the complainant is then liable for false arrest if the
accused can show that the complainant fabricated the charge. Even
though this avenue imposes no liability upon the officer, the police
rarely inform the abused wife of this possibility.75 Finally, when
the conduct complained of consists of threats or quarrelling using
"vulgar, profane language, and such conduct occurs in the officer's
presence" the charge of "disturbing the peace" may be used to
arrest the offender. 76
A formal challenge to the deficiencies of police department re
sponse to domestic disturbance calls has been made in New York
City. In Bruno v. Codd,77 plaintiffs, abused women, brought suit
73. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 90.
74. The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Remedies, supra note 69. D.
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 90.
75. D. MARTIN, supra note 4; The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Re
medies, supra note 69.
76. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259,
264 (1971).
77. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1978) (defendant police department's motion for summary judgment denied). In re
sponse to defendant police officers' argument with regard to municipal immunity and
the discretionary power of the police officers, the court stated:
Plaintiffs do not seek to abolish the traditional discretionary powers of the
police; they merely seek to compel the police to exercise their discretion in
each "particular situation," and not to automatically decline to make an ar
rest solely because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other.
Id. at 1047,396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
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against the police department, the family court, and the city proba
tion employees. The complaint alleged that police officers called to
the scene of a husband's assault on his wife "uniformly refuse[ d] to
take action," even if the physical evidence showed injury. The
plaintiffs also alleged that officers told the victims that they were
unable to render assistance or make an arrest solely because the
victim was the wife of the assailant. The court denied the police
department-defendants' motion for summary judgment because of
the existence of a factual issue as to whether the police had per
formed their duty of providing wives with proper police service.
On June 25, 1978, corporation counsel Allen G. Schwartz, the
attorney for Police Commissioner Robert McGuire, signed a 1000
word consent judgment obligating the police to arrest men who
commit felonious assault, or any other felonies, against their wives
as long as there is reasonable cause to believe that the husband
committed the crime. 78 The agreement dispensed with adjudication
of the factual issue of past police conduct. A motion to dismiss the
complaint, made by the remaining defendants, the city probation
and family court employees, was granted on appeal. 79

But, in Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975),
the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's dismissal of an action for wrong
ful death brought by the woman-de cedent's administrator. Here, a woman had been
killed by her estranged husband after the police had failed to respond for 45 minutes.
There had been 20 calls to the police in the past, and on one occasion the estranged
husband had been arrested. The court held the police department had absolute im
munity from failure to provide sufficient police protection. But cf. Tarasoff v. Re
gents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
78. Bruno v. McGuire, No. 21946176 (N.Y. App. Div., June 26, 1978) (consent
decree). Under the agreement, the police will send officers out whenever a woman
calls and says her husband has assaulted or threatened her. In addition to arresting
in felony cases, if there is reason to believe that a lesser crime has been committed,
the officers must still arrest unless they have proper "justification" not to arrest.
They will not refuse to arrest just because the woman has not first been to family
court. In addition, the officers may not use the potential reconciliation of the hus
band and wife as an excuse not to arrest.
The police also agreed to mandatory arrests in all cases where the woman has
been to family court, has obtained an order of protection, and subsequently was as
saulted or threatened by her husband. The police further agreed that upon interven
tion in a husband-wife assault, they will remain on the scene, temporarily, to protect
the wife and assist her in obtaining medical help if necessary. If the husband has left
the premises, the police will follow "the same procedure for locating the husband as
would be followed in cases" of crimes outside the family. Finally, supervisors at
police precincts are responsible for their subordinates' compliance with all require
ments of the agreement.
79. Bruno v. Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978).
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Prosecutonal Function
In most jurisdictions, screening and diversion by the prose
cutor's office may result in the individual prosecuting attorney's de
cision not to prosecute. Even if a victim is successful in having an
arrest effected, this system of selective enforcement makes it dif
ficult for her to proceed with criminal litigation. Most prosecutors'
perceptions of domestic disputes often produce dismissals and re
ductions of charges.
Perhaps prosecutors are reluctant to encourage litigation be
cause a criminal charge mandates high bail, and upon conviction,
long incarceration. 8o At the San Francisco District Attorney's Bu
reau of Family Relations, the following "fundamentals" must exist
before a complaint is authorized and a warrant sought: (1) a crime
as defined by the California Penal Code, (2) identification of a spe
cific defendant, (3) proof, such as witnesses and documents (if chil
dren are the only witnesses the district attorney will not accept the
case), (4) severe injuries, and (5) willingness of the victim to tes
tify.81 The unlikelihood of all of these factors existing, particularly
"severe" injuries and proof thereof, accounts for the failure to pros
ecute in the majority of cases brought to the attention of the
bureau of family relations.
Faced with reluctant prosecutors,82 often a complainant is forced
to accept intermediary steps such as warning letters, civil protec
tion orders,83 or peace bonds. 84 There is- generally no statutory basis
for peace bonds, and they are only as strong as subsequent enforce
ment. Because they are seldom enforced, they are ineffective.
80. Truninger, supra note 76, at 264.
81. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 109.
82.
It is simply unfair, in light of the systematic discouragment that
victims receive from the police and the time-consuming and almost insuper
able hurdles to prosection erected by the district attorney's office, to blame
the women for failing to follow through against their attackers and to use
this failure as a primary excuse for nonenforcement of the law .... In many
cases the reason a victimized woman drops charges or refuses to testify is
not that she needs to be violently abused but the opposite need, to avoid a
violent retaliation.
R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 179-80 (quoting Susan Jackson, attorney in
San Francisco).
83. See notes 154-57 infra and accompanying text.
84. Peace bonds are warnings ordering the aggressor to cease molesting or as
saulting his wife. A California statute continues the bond for six months after is
suance, and the court may require the accused to post bond not exceeding $5,000.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 706 (West 1970). The most recent appellate case involving §
706 was decided in 1943. In re Way, 56 Cal. App. 2d 814, 133 P.2d 637 (1943).

1979]

WIFE ABUSE

583

Peace bonds may also involve constitutional problems because they
fail to provide for trial by jury, fail to provide free counsel, fail to re
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and may subject a person
to double jeopardy by providing that a conviction for breach of peace
will be conclusive evidence of violating the security provision. 85
If the police fail to arrest the abusing husband, the victim can
file a complaint on her own initiative with the local clerk of courts,
the district attorney, or the prosecutor. The facts in Bruno v.
Codd 86 illustrate the difficulty with such an approach. The plaintiffs
alleged that family court petition clerks failed to allow petitioners
timely access to the judge and abused their discretion in determin
ing whether the complaints were sufficient to warrant preparation
of a petition.
Thus, prosecutors, like police authorities, avoid invoking the
87
law. Instead, efficient dispositions are achieved by discouraging
women from pursuing prosecution. Once again women are faced
with tacit condonation of the abuser's conduct and the likelihood of
further violence.

Judicial Function
Even if the prosecutor decides to prosecute, the next hurdle
to surmount is the court system. The issuance of a warrant is usu
85. Truninger, supra note 76, at 266. If an indigent is unable to post bond he
may be jailed in violation of his rights under the equal protection clause. This fea
ture generates further constitutional problems. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
(imprisoning indigent for failure to pay traffic fines violated equal protection).
86. 90 Misc. 2d at 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (1977). The defendant probation
department employees' motion to dismiss the complaint was denied due to evidence
demonstrating a "callous disregard by probation officers of the statutory rights of
women ... who need immediate protection from assaults by their husbands." How
ever, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, reversed
on the ground that the record did not present a properly justiciable cause. Bruno v.
Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978).
Similarly, a suit filed in 1975 in Cleveland, Ohio, Raguez v. Chandler; No. C74
1064 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 9, 1975) resulted in a consent decree in which the pros
ecutor agreed to provide the relief requested, to give full consideration to each case
on its merits, to schedule a prosecutor's hearing or request an investigation by the
detective bureau if an arrest warrant or summons is not issued and the complaint is
not frivolous, to provide and notify the woman of her rights to re-evaluation of a
decision not to prosecute an alleged assailant, and to notify the police that men who
assault women will be prosecuted.
87. D. NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA 129-30 (1974).
One chief prosecutor has stated that "the sanctity of the marriage is more sacred
than the criminal law and the one-punch fight ... it overrides the criminal code." R.
LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 157-58, (quoting Chief Prosecutor of Wash
tenaw County, Michigan).
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ally a discretionary act by a magistrate, which occurs at a citation
or preliminary hearing. This procedure rarely considers the future
safety of the woman. Moreover, it may serve to distract the com
plainant from her original purpose and lead her to believe errone
ously that something is being done. "The woman who actually
manages to have an arrest made and withstands the conciliation
attempts of the prosecutor's office must expect cynicism regarding
her intentions at every stage, even inside the courtroom itself. "88
In Chicago's Court of Domestic Relations, "brief hearings are held,
commonly followed by the imposition of an unfilled-out, unse
cured, unrecorded, but threateningly imposed 'peace bond.' "89
The Chicago magistrates who were interviewed all acknowledged
the sham, extra-legal nature of the peace bond. Often domestic
violence proceedings are not accorded traditional courtroom dig
nity.
In Detroit, where the proceedings are conducted in an or
dered, dignified manner, "the lack of problem-solving dispositions
remains the same."90 Judges may attempt to "string the case out"
to allow the parties to resolve their differences, and then dismiss
the case. Or, if this isn't successful, and a finding of guilty occurs,
Detroit judges generally place the defendant on probation. 91
Hence, although sanctions are imposed, little is accomplished. 92
The judicial problem is not limited to failure to enforce exist
ing laws, but also includes regressive judicial interpretation of cur
rent law. To illustrate, California has a statute making it a felony
for a man to inflict corporal injury on his wife. 93 The harm re
88. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 114-15. Martin also states, "if judges would get
tough and act like judges, rather than counselors or even practical jokers, perhaps
battered women could obtain relief through the judicial process." Id. at 118.
89. Pamas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRIM. L.
BULL. 733, 748 (1973). See also notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
90. Pamas, supra note 89, at 749.
91. Id.
92. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
93. Any husband who willfully inflicts upon his wife corporal injury result
ing in a traumatic condition, and any person who willfully inflicts upon any
child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a
traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years
or in the county jail for not more than one year.
CAL. PENAL COPE ~ 273d (Deering 1971) (amended 1977). The new section reads as
follows:
Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or any person who
willfully inflicts upon any person of the opposite sex with whom he or she is
cohabiting, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in

1979]

WIFE ABUSE

585

quired to sustain a conviction under this California law is greater
than simple assault but less than aggravated assault. 94 Neverthe
less, in People v. Jones,95 a woman was convicted of manslaughter
for killing her husband while defending herself against an assault as
defined in California Penal Code section 273(d). Under California
law, homicide while resisting a felony is justifiable. 96 The court
held that a felony of the type defined in section 273( d) would not
sustain an acquittal on grounds of justifiable homicide. 97 The judge
in Jones stated that "the legislative purpose in enacting section
273(d) . . . was to reduce domestic conflict, not to promote resort
to violence . . . . "98 Such reasoning indicates that courts have the
attitude that the criminal justice system is not the place for domes
tic problems. 99

the state prison, or in the county jail for not more than one year.
CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 273.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1978).
Corporal injury is not defined by the statute, but has been held to be a "touch
ing of the person of another against his will with physical force in an intentional,
hostile and aggravated manner, or projecting of such force against his person."
People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873, 200 P.2d 134, 137 (1948).
94. People v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. App. 2d 665, 318 P.2d 157 (1957) (broken jaw
and contusions about the face, constituting aggravated assault-conviction pursuant
to ~ 273d affirmed); People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P.2d 132 (1948)
(injuries and bruises on face and body, constituting simple assault-conviction pur
suant to ~ 273d reversed). Aggravated assault is frequently classified as such by
virtue of statutory provision when the assault is of a serious or heinous nature.
95. 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1961).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 197 (Deering 1976).
97. Although in Jones the court instructed the jury that the requirement for
justifiable homicide would be satisfied if there were reasonable apprehension of
death or great bodily harm, it was found that there was no such fear, although the
deceased had picked up a table knife, raised it, and threatened to kill the defendant.
One recent case, however, reached a different result. In People v. Cameron, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1976), the court rejected an equal protection argument
involving ~ 273d and affirmed the conviction. The plaintiff argued that it applied
only to married men, that the definition of the crimes was vague, and that it subjected
one to cruel and unusual punishment. Cf People v. Thomas, 65 Cal. App. 3d 854,
135 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976) (~ 273d applied with same result with regard to child
abuse).
98. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 482, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
99. The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Remedies, supra note 69.
The handling of domestic dispute cases by our courts is only one example of
the failure of our criminal process to serve even loosely defined "correc
tional" functions . . . . The lectures, threats, fines, permissive referrals, un
supervised probation, or even probation with pro forma supervision which
are substituted accomplish little in the reduction of recidivism. With respect
to domestic disputants in court, few are sentenced to jail, and the great
majority are handled summarily and off-the-cuff. What little innovation is
utilized by our courts is frequently and disturbingly extralegal.
Pamas, supra note 89, at 747-48.
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Legislative Function
A recent development has been the enactment of legislation
aimed at intra-family offenses. This legislation gives courts a wider
range of dispositional powers to effect rehabilitation rather than re
tribution. Both New York 100 and the District of Columbia101 have
enacted statutes which divert intra-family offenses from the crimi
nal court, making them civil or family offenses. These statutes take
away from the complainant the physical protection provided by ar
rest and successful criminal prosecution. Pennsylvania and Massa
chusetts, however, have adopted legislation which places an affir
mative duty on the police and the courts to provide temporary
protection for persons suffering abuse. 102
The New York statute requires that cases involving truly crim
inal conduct be transferred to the criminal court. It was construed
in Montalvo v. Montalvo,loa as defining the policy that wives and
others bringing assault charges against family members generally
do so to secure practical help, not criminal conviction and punish
ment. The family court will retain jurisdiction if it finds that the
processes available are likely to be helpful to the family.
The District of Columbia statute seeks to assure that those
charged "will be, if they are offenders, civil offenders . . . . We do
not wish to stigmatize them. We want to keep their earning capac
ity and also the possibility of self-respect and their connection with
the family. "104 Once again, the woman's future safety is jeopar
dized in order to preserve her husband's social and economic
standing in the community. 105
As a result of the inadequacies of the existing remedies,
Pennsylvania recently adopted legislation which provides tempo
ary relief for abused women. lOS Upon a showing of immediate and
present danger of abuse, the court of common pleas has the juris
diction to issue a temporary order of protection which requires the
100. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 812 (McKinney 1975).
101. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16.1001 (1973).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977); 1978 Mass. Acts
ch.447.
103. 55 Misc. 2d 699, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1968). See also People v. Berger, 40
App. Div. 2d 192, 338 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1972).
104. Judge Joseph Ryan, Proceedings, D.C. Bar Association's Orientation on
the Superior Court 124-26 (Jan. 9, 1971), in Thompson, Representing the Accused
Charged with an Intra/amily Offense, 18 PRAC. L. 41, 42 (Dec. 1972).
105. Fields, Representing Battered Wives, or What to do Until the Police Ar
rive, [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025.
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, H 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
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abuser to vacate the home. 107 The act alleviates the problem of
physical abuse for the duration of the court order.
Massachusetts has also adopted an act providing certain tem
porary protection for persons suffering abuse. 108 The act mandates
that any court order which has been issued as a result of a domes
tic dispute shall bear the follOwing language: "VIOLATION
OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE." Massachusetts
law enforcement agencies are directed to establish procedures
whereby an officer at the scene of the alleged violation will know
the terms of the orders. The officer is also directed to use every
reasonable means to enforce the orders. Additionally, any violation
of the orders is a misdemeanor. 109
Section two of the act describes the methods by which a
petitioner may procure an order protecting her from abuse, and
enumerates the terms which may be included. 110 If the plaintiff
demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse,

107. Note, supra note 55. Because it offers only temporary relief, the act is ef
fective as an emergency measure only. There are no provisions for rehabilitation
or other methods of ending the abuse. Before the act, the woman had the option to
leave, but the burden was on her to provide her own alternate living arrangements.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Pitucci v. Pitucci, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 189 A.2d 912
(1963) (wife's right to support defeated upon her withdrawal from husband's home
without adequate legal reason such as grounds for divorce or separation). Strong
emotional and psychological factors, such as guilt due· to the myth that the wife is
responsible for marital harmony, are also involved in a woman's decision to leave.
108. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 198 (West). The text of this act is reprinted in full
in McLellan, Massachusetts Divorce Practice and Procedure, 1 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 277, 321 n.191 (1978).
109. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 198 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 208, § 34C).
110. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 199 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3). The order may include:
(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether
the defendant is an adult or minor;
(b) ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith the household;
(c) awarding the plaintiff in the case of husband or wife temporary cus
tody of a minor;
(d) ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or
any child in the plaintiff's custody, or both, when the defendant has a legal
obligation to support such person;
(e) ordering the defendant to pay to the person abused monetary com
pensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse. Compensatory
losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support, out
of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, moving expenses and reasonable at
torney fees.

ld.
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the court may enter a temporary order without notice, and thereaf
ter notify the defendant and give him an opportunity to be
heard. 111
Chapter 209A, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws
directs any law officer to use all reasonable means to prevent
further abuse,112 including the right to arrest even if the violation
is a misdemeanor pursuant to section thirty-four C of chapter
208. 113 This provision partially alleviates a weakness in the law of
arrest.114 The Massachusetts act, like the Pennsylvania act, pro
vides relief from abuse for the duration of the court order. How
ever, the Massachusetts act provides that the terms and conditions
of the disposition of any criminal complaint may include "referral of
the defendant to a clinic, facility or professional for one or more
examinations, diagnoses, counseling or treatment; . . . or release of
the defendant to the custody of a residential treatment facility. "115
Thus, by virtue of the new act, Massachusetts courts are given the
discretion to order rehabilitation services for the offender. 116
111. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West Supp. 1979).
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1979). Other reasonable
means include the following:
(1) remaining on the scene as long as there is a danger to the physical
safety of such person without the presence of a law officer, including but not
limited to staying in the dwelling unit;
(2) assisting such person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by
an assault, including driving the victim to the emergency room of the
nearest hospital;
(3) giving such person immediate and adequate notice of his rights;
(4) arresting the person if the officer has probable cause to believe that
a felony has been committed, or a misdemeanor has been committed in the
officer's presence, or a misdemeanor has been committed pursuant to section
thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight.
Id.
113. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
114. See notes 72 & 73 supra and accompanying text.
115. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 202 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 276, § 42A).
116. Clearly, "the police owe a duty of protection to battered wives, in the
same manner they owe it to any citizen injured by another's assault...." 90 Misc. 2d
at 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 977. This is not to say, however, that abusive husbands are
not themselves in need of help as "victims of society." This may indeed be true of
all those who commit criminal acts. But the personal deprivations, agonies, or frus
trations of the perpetrator do not prevent his or her arrest as a burglar, murderer, or
saboteur.
The legal response to wife abusers might well include counseling and voca
tional training. This might be seen as society's compensating the abuser for whatever
it did to him.
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THE CIVIL LAW

In addition to criminal sanctions, civil remedies should be
available to any victim of violence. Civil remedies are needed
when the criminal justice system denies protection to abused wives
because of the perception that "domestic quarrels" are family mat
ters, not to be interfered with by police and criminal courts. In a
further search for aid, an abused wife may therefore seek justice
through the civil law. However, here she will also find additional
legal and procedural barriers. Civil remedies needed by the wife
include tort actions, orders of protection and divorce.

lnterspousal Tort Actions
As outlined earlier, when social standards which were once
universally accepted begin to lose their assumption of validity, a
stage of crisis emerges, characterized by an abundance of contradic
tory beliefs and behavior.u7 The law, reflecting the crisis, retains
much of the old while tentatively exploring the new, and becomes,
itself, wrought with controversy. The law of interspousal tort im
munity illustrates the impact on the legal system of the emerging
crisis in social ideology.
At common law, it was well settled that, under coverture, the
personal and property rights of a woman were virtually suspended
during marriage. us The civil law made the husband and wife into
one person-that one being the husband. u9 A wife could not sue
or be sued in tort, own property, or make contracts. 120 Even a wife
who lived apart from her husband and earned her own living could
not bring an action for injury to her property by third persons. 121
117. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
118. Coverture implies that a woman is "under the protection of her husband,
and the common law will not allow her to do anything which may prejudice her
rights or interests, without his advice, consent and approval. ... This sole act of a
femme covert was simply void...." Osborn v. Horine, 19 Ill. 124, 125 (1857).
119. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND § 598 (W.
Jones ed. 1915).
120. See Interspousal Violence: Insights But No Instant Answers, [1976-1977]
3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2527.
121. Moores v. Carter, 17 F. Cas. 714 (1828). Ann Moores lived apart from her
husband Benjamin Moores, and "by her industry had become possessed of a small
dwelling-house," which the defendants had broken into, vandalized and burglarized.
Not only could Ann not bring an action in trespass herself, it was improper for her to
be joined in the action; for as she had owned nothing, she had lost nothing.
Every species of personal property which the wife may acquire by purchase,
by her own labor, or by gift, during the coverture, belongs to the husband,
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In addition, anything a wife earned belonged to her husband. 122
Coverture required that even where there was personal bodily
injury to the wife, she could sue only by joining her husband. 123 If
she were to sue her husband in tort, he would be on both sides of
the controversy, joined in an action against himself. Thus a wife
was barred from bringing an action in tort against her husband, no
matter how grievous the harm he inflicted, irrespective of whether
the attack constituted a sufficient ground for divorce. 124
In the post Civil War era all American jurisdictions passed
Married Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts. 125 These laws were
designed to remove the common law disabilities of a married
woman and to give her the status of a femme sole. 126 A wife was
given the right to own property in her own name, to enter into
contracts, to keep her own earnings, to sue or be sued, to dispose
of property in a will, and to establish her own separate place of resi
dence with or without the permission of her husband. 127
The acts varied greatly in language 128 and judicial interpreta
and consequently an injury to that property, or the taking of it away, can
only give a right of action to the husband, and not to the wife.
The dwelling-house, and all the goods and chattels purchased or owned
by the wife, belonged to the husband, and for an injury done to that property
the husband alone must sue. This doctrine is too well settled to be con
troverted....

ld.
122. "Services performed by a wife, for another for compensation, are pre
sumed to be given on the husband's behalf." Plummer v. Trost, 81 Mo. 425 (1884).
Where a wife's father gave her money, with which she purchased fowls and material
for sewing, and, by sale of the fowls and her labor on the materials and other work,
she accumulated money, it belonged to her husband's estate. Appeal of Speakman,
71 Pa. 25 (1872). The husband's right to the services and earnings of his wife is
absolute. Belford v. Crane, 16 N.J. Eq. 265 (1863).
123. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 (1860). In a malpractice suit for personal
injuries to the wife by a physician, the wife, if surviving, would not be able to main
tain a separate action.
124. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877). Mrs. Abbott was beaten, bound in
irons, and forcibly imprisoned in an insane asylum by her husband and his cohorts.
Her injuries at their hands were grounds for divorce because American law no longer
allowed .a man to strike his wife. However, as the assault took place during cover
ture, the wife could maintain no action against her husband or his confederates.
125. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (West 1958); MISS. CODE ANN. §
93-3-3 (1972); S.C. CODE § 10-216 (1962).
126. Note, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The Marital Relationship in Tort
Law, 43 UMKC L. REV. 334, 336 (1975).
127. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 39.
128. Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.290 (1977) reads as follows:
A married woman shall be deemed a femme sole so far as to enable her to
carry on and transact business on her own account, to contract and be con
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tion regarding the possibility of interspousal tort suits was divided.
The very passage of the acts is evidence of the initial breakdown of
the social paradigm which had given birth to and sustained the com
mon law approach. The varied interpretations demonstrate the con
troversy inherent in the crisis of social ideology which followed the
breakdown. Some judges were quick to embrace a new concept of
the role of women in society and their rights under the law. 129
Others clung to the familiar, astounded by the audacity of a notion
which, to them, challenged the sanctity of the very basis of Ameri
can life, the family.130
In some jurisdictions, therefore, the language giving married
women the legal right to "sue and be sued" was construed to grant
a wife the right to bring an action against her husband for damages
resulting from assault and battery or other intentional torts. In
eloquent opinions, these courts declared that civilization and jus
tice had progressed to the point of holding a man liable for assaults
upon the person of his wife. The fact that a man was married to his
victim could no longer exempt him from such liability.13l
tracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have enforced against
her property such judgments as may be rendered for or against her ... with
or without her husband being joined as a party....
"A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but
this section shall not be construed to authorize suits between husband and wife."
HAWAll REv. STAT. § 573-5 (1976). "A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be
sued without joining her husband with her to the same extent as if she were unmar
ried; provided, that neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the
person committed during coverture." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1959). "Husband
and wife may sue each other." MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-3 (1972). "Nothing in this
chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract with or to sue each
other ...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-5 (West 1968). "A husband and wife have a cause
of action against each other to recover damages sustained to their person or property
as if they were unmarried." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1976). "A married woman may
sue and be sued as if she were unmarried. When the action is between herself and
her husband she may likewise sue or be sued ...." S.C. CODE § 10-216 (1962).
129. "The Legislature ... has given the wife an action against the husband for
injuries to her property rights, and we can hardly conceive that the Legislature in
tended to deny her the right to sue him separately, in tort, for damages arising from
assaults upon her person." Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77 So. 335, 338
(1917).
130. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868). In dicta the court stated
that although husbands have no right to whip their wives, courts won't interfere,
because to do so would inflict on society the greater evil of "raising the curtain upon
domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence." [d. at 459.
131. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her
eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from
liability to her on the ground that he vowed at the altar to 'love, cherish, and
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In a majority of jurisdictions, however, the spectre of litigious,
designing, or malevolent women suing their husbands for alleged
injuries, dragging the private aspects of marriage through the
"mud" of litigation, was more than the courts could face. 132 Al
though many of the acts, read literally, would allow such actions, 133
the courts were able to interpret the words to fit judicial concepts
of the proper order of the universe, by construing the acts strictly,
as being in derogation of the common law. 134 In Thompson v.
Thompson 135 for example, the United States Supreme Court con
strued a Washington, D.C. statute which read "married women
shall have the power . . . to sue separately . . . for torts committed
against them as fully and freely as if they were unmarried. . . . "136
The majority, relying on the floodgate theory,137 and determined
to protect the privacy of marriage, held that the statute could not
have been intended to allow a wife to bring an assault and battery
action against her husband.

•

protect' her. We have progressed that far in civilization and justice . . . .
Wives are no chattels. There are half a million women voters in North
Carolina. They do not need to beg for protection for their persons, their
property or their characters. They can command it.
105 S.E. at 210 (complete quotation in unofficial reporter only). "If [the wife] may
sue him for a broken promise, why may she not sue him for a broken arm?" Brown v.
Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 A. 889, 891 (1914). "If a married woman is either injured
or damaged by another's illegal act, the statute gives her a remedy even though that
other is her husband. . . ." Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 5, 95 A. 657, 657 (1915).
"[W]e are unable to perceive wherein either public policy, or society, or the sanctity
of the home, or the sacred relations of marriage, is better protected by denying her a
reasonable compensation for injuries maliciously and feloniously inflicted upon her
by a husband with a shotgun loaded with buckshot ...." Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla.
124, 129-30, 140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914).
132. The right to sue her husband in an action of assault and battery may
perhaps be covered under the literal language ... but I think such was not
the meaning and intent of the legislature ... the effect of giving so broad a
construction . . . might be to involve the husband and wife in perpetual
controversy and litigation-to sow the seeds of perpetual domestic disorder.
Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368-69 (N.Y. 1863).
133. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (West 1969). For a complete discussion
of the interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law, see 3 C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 61 (4th ed. 1974).
134. "Statutes which ... establish rights or provide benefits ... not recognized
by the common law have frequently been held subject to strict . . . interpretation
[and] ... are given the effect which makes the least ... change in the common law."
[d. at 41.
135. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
136. [d. at 615-16.
137. "[T]his construction would at the sa-me time open the doors of the courts
to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other. ..." [d. at 617.
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The dissenting opinion, by Justice Harlan, jOined by Justice
Holmes and Justice Hughes, insisted that the function of the Court
was to decide only what the statute said, and not what it should
say.1 38 Although this dissent has been widely quoted and praised in
both cases 139 and commentary,140 the majority holding remains the
law regarding interspousal tort immunity in the District of Colum
bia. 141 In addition to the District of Columbia, a dwindling major
ity of American jurisdictions continues to uphold interspousal tort
immunity. 142
The trend, however, is definitely toward abrogation of the doc
trine, especially in situations where its underlying policies are con
sidered inapplicable. When the harmony of the home has already
been severely disrupted, as where the husband has been beating
his wife, the basis for denying recovery for intentional physical
attacks no longer exists. 143 Terminating the marriage by separation,
death, or divorce further emphasizes the absence of an underlying
rationale. 144 As the foundations of interspousal tort immunity lose
all but historical Significance, the doctrine comes under increased
attack. 145 "The entering wedge is recognition that there is a tort,
but disability to sue for it; . . . when the reasons for the disability
138. "[Ilt is not within the functions of the court to ward off the dangers feared
or the evils threatened simply by a judicial construction that will defeat the plainly
expressed will of the legislative department." Id. at 621 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. "We are impelled to say that the philosophy of this great jurist appeals to
us with more force and soundness and impresses us as more in harmony with the
modem legislative intent on this question...." Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 129,
140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914). See also Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206
(1920).
140. E.g., Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband
& Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 156 (1961); Note, Domestic
Relations-Husband & Wife-Right of Wife To Sue Husband for Tort, 32 OR. L.
REV. 60,65 (1952).
141. "The doctrine of interspousal immunity prevails in the District of Colum
bia." Edmunds v. Edmunds, 353 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
142. E.g., Florida, Georgia, and Illinois. See note 145 infra.
143. We hold that when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the per
son of his wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged
that there is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintaining of
an action for damages and she may therefore maintain an action.
Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 271, 287 P.2d 585, 598 (1955).
•
144. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 863-64 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).
145. For compilations of states which hold majority and minority positions, see
Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343, 355-58 (1965); 4B PERSONAL IN
JURY (Matthew Bender) §§ 5-9 (1970 & Supp.); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955 &
Supp.).
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fail, the tort becomes actionable. "146 Of the growing minority of
jurisdictions which have abrogated interspousal immunity, some
have done so for both intentional tort and negligence actions, 147
while others have retained some limitations on the right of the
husband and wife to sue each other in tort. 148 The state of the law,
then, remains in flux, reflecting the conflicting views extant today
of the social and legal nature of the husband-wife relationship.
Although for many abused women, a judgment proof husband
or fear of retaliation give a remedy in tort little significance, in
appropriate circumstances the abused wife must have such a rem
edy available to her. Where no personal or legal bar to litigation
or judgment exists, an award of damages may give an abused wife
the money she needs to get away from her husband and start a
new life. In addition, the availability of such suits may have a de
terrent effect on some abusive husbands. At any rate, the denial of
legal recourse to the victim of an intentional tort simply because
the tortfeasor is her spouse, is based on the tenets of a fading social
order. The emerging social paradigm, which assumes equal treat
ment of women under the law, gives rise to demands that such
disabilities be removed.

The Family Couris
Another area of the civil law to which many abused wives turn
for assistance is that administered by the family courts. Available
remedies include a variety of injunctive orders as well as actions
pertaining to the marriage relationship, such as separation and di
vorce. However, a woman seeking protection from her abusive
husband through the family courts is likely to find only a time con
suming and costly process which, in the end, avails her no relief.
In some states, primary jurisdiction for adjudication of all intra
family violence cases lies with the family court.149 But family court
judges in these and other jurisdictions often treat the abused wife
no better than do those in the criminal courts. The family court's
ambivalent attitude regarding interspousal violence illustrates the
legal response to the uncertain and changing state of social attitudes
toward married women. Although statutes and case law may at times
reflect the revolutionary notion that it is the duty of the legal sys
146. W. PROSSER, supra note 144, at 863.
147. For example, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and
New Mexico. See note 145 supra.
148.· For example, Oregon and Wisconsin. See note 145 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 100-15 supra.
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tern to protect women from abusive husbands,150 those charged
with administering the law remain champions of the older ideology
regarding women, family, and marriage. 151 Family court clerks and
probation officers may misstate the law to women seeking court
assistance. 152 Judges may ignore statutory provisions imposing
stricter sanctions and operate on the assumption that their role is
to achieve reconciliation rather then to protect the victim of abuse.
Family law and courts are supposedly acting in the interests of
the family unit, though at the expense of married women. The at
titude of the legislature, police and judges is that they are dealing
not with a public crime, but with signs of a troubled marriage. 153
One remedy offered by the family court is an order of protec
tion, or restraining order, which theoretically requires that a hus
band stay away from his wife. In practice, however, obtaining the
order involves retaining an attorney, filing petitions, and then wait
ing ten days before testifying at a hearing. During this time the
woman is unprotected from her husband. 154 Even if she has the
stamina and determination to obtain the order, she is very likely to
find that if her husband violates the order it will not be enforced
against him, and may merely serve to incite him to further violence
against her.155 Such restraining orders waste time, energy, money,
150. See Baker v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1966), holding that the issuance of a protective order to a woman who had been
beaten by her husband created a special duty in the police to protect her.
151. [T]hose who execute decisions . . . mediate the written word with
their cultural inheritance and personal prejudice. As a result, even where
the law has provisions to aid the battered wife ... [she] may find a major
obstacle in the stereotypical ideas of marriage, of appropriate behavior
within marriage, and of marital violence which are held by the law officials
with whom she must deal.
Comment, Battered Wives: Some Social and Legal Problems, 2 BRIT. J.L. &
SOC'y 201 (1975).
152. "And, in one alleged incident, a woman in fear of her husband's attacks
was informed by a petition clerk that seeing a judge would not 'help' unless she was
prepared herself to serve a summons upon her husband." 90 Misc. 2d at 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 979.
153. Goodman, Abused by her Husband-And the Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1975, at 35, col. 2.
154. For attempts by the legislatures of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts to rem
edy this situation, see notes 106-15 supra.
155. "The order may make a woman feel more secure, but it does so falsely and
only temporarily, because the man will be free to assault her again and will do so."
Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 135, 157 (1977). The failure to enforce restraining orders parallels the prob
lem with subsequent enforcement of peace bonds by the criminal courts. See note 84
supra.
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and emotion and consequently many legal aid attorneys refuse to
obtain them. "To raise the hopes of a woman by obtaining a mean
ingless piece of paper is cruel and shows a lack of respect for the
intelligence of our clients. "156
In addition, in most jurisdictions, either by law or by custom,
a restraining order will only be issued if separation or divorce pro
ceedings have been initiated. 157 Thus this remedy is not available
to the woman who has not yet decided on divorce. ISS
"These failures of the legal system restrict the victim's liberty,
forcing her to suffer beatings which over the years increase in fre
quency and severity. "159 The abused wife may thus be forced, by
the failure of police and the courts to stop her husband from beat
ing her, to seek dissolution of her marriage. This will have been
accomplished, ironically, by the very family court system which has
denied the woman protection by fashioning remedies based on a
policy of preserving the family unit.
For women who decide that divorce or separation is the best
solution in their particular situation, the law of divorce presents
many illogical obstacles based on an outmoded social order. Al
though some jurisdictions have adopted "no-fault" dissolutions with
no other grounds for divorce,160 others retain fault defenses which
preclude equitable alimony settlements and distribution of prop
erty.161

156. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 109. But see notes 106-15 supra and accom
panying text.
157. For example, see Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women: Abuse and
the Law 2 (Jan. 1977) (unpublished report).
158. See note 43 supra.
159. Fields, supra note 105.
160. A typical statute of this kind is as follows:
§4506. Grounds for dissolution or legal separation
A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal separation on
either of the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally:
(1) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage.
(2) Incurable insanity.
§ 4507. Irreconcilable differences defined
Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are detennined by
the court to be substantial reason for not continuing the marriage and which
make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4506, 4507 (West 1970).
No-fault dissolution statutes vary from state to state with some requiring waiting
periods, separation agreements, actual separation, or agreement of both parties before
a divorce will be granted. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 295-99 (1977).
161. These are generally jurisdictions which, without revising all their divorce
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Divorce reform is moving rapidly, and many jurisdictions allow
no-fault divorces where agreed to by both parties. l62 A few juris
dictions grant divorces on no-fault grounds only.l63 For the woman
who does not fear her husband, the major reason for wanting a
divorce is the desire for independent legal status, including the
right to remarry.164 For the abused wife, however, divorce can
mean that she will have some protection through the legal system
if her ex-husband threatens or abuses her, as well as redress
through the civil tort law. 165
In those jurisdictions which retain fault defenses, it may be
necessary to prove continued and violent attacks to obtain a di
vorce. 166 In addition, a woman who has left the home may be
found to have abandoned or deserted her husband. The presump
tion of desertion created by her having left the home is difficult to
rebut without evidence to corroborate her claims of having been
forced to flee out of fear of her husband's violence against her and
her children. l67 Once determined to have been at fa_ult, the woman
may be denied the divorce. If the divorce is granted to the hus
band, the woman may, on the basis of being at fault, be denied
alimony or an equitable property settlement. 168
law, simply tacked a ground such as "irreconcilable differences," or simply proof of
actual separation, onto a list which included grounds such as adultery, cruelty, and
abandonment. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw art. 10, § 170 (McKinney 1977).
For an intensive discussion of various grounds for dissolution and property set
tlements in Massachusetts, see McLellan, supra note 108.
162. For a rundown of the grounds for divorce as of August 1, 1977 in each
state in the country, see Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Over
view, [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4047.
163. See the California statute at note 160 supra.
164. H. KRAUSE, supra note 160, at 361-62.
165. "[D]ivorce is a very practical remedy. Divorce and the accompanying sup
port and custody decrees give a woman economic and psychological freedom. A di
vorce judgment is also the best way to get the man out of the house. . . ." Note,
supra note 2, at 159. In addition, interspousal tort immunity does not apply, of
course, to people who are no longer married for torts committed after the dissolution
of their marriage.
166. "The battered wife should be aware that hospital, medical, police, and
criminal court records can be used to prove her claims of abuse in her divorce pro
ceedings." R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 215.
167. "Wives of professional or businessmen have a hard time proving physical
cruelty unless they have photographs, witnesses or medical reports. Judges are defe
rential to and identify with high-status men. They do not believe wives who claim
that these men have committed the 'lower class' act of wife beating." Fields, supra
note 105, at 4026.
168. "[I]f a divorce is granted against a wife on a 'fault' ground, she is pre
cluded from obtaining alimony. . . ." Krane v. Krane, 83 Misc. 2d 714, 715, 373
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Some states allow divorce on both fault and no-fault grounds.
In these jurisdictions, the husband of a woman who files for a no
fault divorce may counterclaim on the basis of fault, challenging
the wife's right to an equitable property settlement. l69 Thus the
woman must obtain her husband's consent or acquiescence to the
divorce, an unlikely occurrence in wife abuse situations; or, the
wife may be coerced into giving up her property rights in return
for an uncontested divorce.
In those jUrisdictions which allow divorce only on grounds
such as irreconcilable differences, the fault of either party is not a
factor. In this context, alimony and property settlements are based
on need and other circumstances unrelated to fault. l70
Because of the inaction of the legal system, the woman often
has no choice but to leave the home and seek alternative shelter.
The old social ideology maintains that a woman belongs in her
home no matter what, and that any woman who leaves the home
may be presumed to have abandoned her husband, forcing him as
the aggrieved party to seek divorce. l7l As this assumption loses its
force, however, it becomes possible to view the break-up of a mar
riage as being the fault of neither party, or to decide that the fault of
either is not a relevant factor. The abused wife is particularly need
ful of this approach. The very nature of wife abuse ensures that
there typically are no witnesses other than children. l72 It is pat-

N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (1975). "[Jludgment of divorce based upon the misconduct of the
wife, ... precludes the wife from receiving alimony or from receiving possession of
the marital residence ...." Orloff v. Orloff, 49 App. Div. 2d 975, 975, 373 N.Y.S.2d
888, 890 (1975).
169. Gamino v. Gamino, 199 So. 2d 202 (La. 1967). The wife contended that
the husband had abandoned the marital home. The record showed that the wife,
without her husband's consent, rented an apartment on a street on which her hus
band had refused to live. The wife was granted a divorce, but "[als a wife is not
entitled to alimony unless she proves her freedom from fault ... and as ... she was
equally guilty of fault, she is not entitled to alimony." Id. at 203.
170. This is not always the result. For instance, the Michigan Court of Appeals
has said that although the legislature has eliminated the fault standard for dissolution
of marriages, it did not intend to modify traditional fault grounds for determining
custody, support, alimony, and property division. Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48
Mich. App. 279, 285, 210 N.W.2d 352, 355 (1973), discussed in Eisenberg & Micklow,
supra note 36, at 153.
171. For a discussion of the way in which the Michigan courts have handled
cases where the wife alleges physical assault, see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note
36, at 152-53.
172. E. Hilberman & K. Munson, Sixty Battered Women: a Preliminary Report,
at 3-5 (May 5, 1977) (unpublished report prepared for American Psychiatric Associa
tion Special Session-Battered Women: Culture as Destiny, Toronto, Canada).
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ently unjust that in addition to being forced out of her home, she
should then have that desperate flight used against her in divorce
or property settlement proceedings.
Thus, the family courts and family law treat abused wives in
much the same manner as do other areas of the law. Although the
treatment is not surprising in light of the present social and
ideological climate, the failure of family courts to come to grips
with the problem of domestic violence is disappointing because this
specialized part of the legal system ought to be among the first to
adapt to the needs of abused women.
CONCLUSION

As feminist reformers successfully challenge outdated concepts
regarding the social and legal status of married women, contradic
tion and confusion in the law of domestic violence will continue to
reflect the resulting ideological crisis. Slow and uneven movement
often characterizes the development of new ideologies. The turmoil
that naturally accompanies social change will eventually subside
with the ascendency of a new paradigm. As new attitudes become
part of the fabric of our social order, the law will respond with
statutes and case law which protect wives from abuse and afford
them equal concern and respect under the law.
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